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Problem Description
Spam can be described as useless messages that pollute peoples email inboxes. The purpose of
spam from the sender's point of view can e.g. be for marketing, for spreading malware or it can be
an element in criminal phishing attacks. It is estimated that about 97% of all email traffic passing
through the Internet is spam. Spam is increasingly sent by botnets that currently are infecting
millions of computers worldwide. Spammers can obtain mailing list e.g. by trading/exchanging
Internet mailing list, by stealing such lists or by searching the Internet for the email addresses. A
single email spam message has virtually no cost to the sender, but a real and noticeable cost to
the recipient. This is in contrast to e.g. normal advertisement sent through the mail, which has a
real cost to the sender.
In order to eliminate spam, organisations apply spam filters in their handling of incoming email. A
problem with spam filters is that they always produce false negatives, false positives or both. No
spam filter is 100% effective. The ratios of false negatives and false positives can often be tuned in
spam filters. The optimal tuning of spam filters will be a function internal variables of an e-mail.
The objective of this Masters project is to investigate the optimality of spam filters from the
specific user's point of view. This will be done by determining the ratios of false negatives and
positives in specific spam filters, and by estimating the cost of false negatives and false positives.
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i
Abstrat
Unsoliited bulk email, ommonly known as spam, represents a signiant
problem on the Internet. The seriousness of the situation is reeted by the
fat that approximately 97% of the total e-mail tra urrently (2009) is
spam. To ght this problem, various anti-spam methods have been proposed
and are implemented to lter out spam before it gets delivered to reipients,
but none of these methods are entirely satisfatory. This thesis analyzes
the properties of spam lters from the viewpoint of Signal Detetion Theory
(SDT). The Bayesian approah of Signal Detetion Theory provides a basis
for determining the tuning of spam lters from the partiular user's point of
view and helps in determining the utility whih the spam lter provides to
the user.
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Abbreviations and Aronyms
E-mail Eletroni Mail
ISP Internet Servie Provider
CO2 Carbon Dioxide
SDT Signal Detetion Theory
MUA Mail User Agent
C Carbon opy
B Blind Carbon opy
SMTP Simple Mail Transfer Protool
POP3 Post Oe Protool Version3
MDA Mail Delivery Agent
ARPANET Advaned Researh Projets Ageny Network
DNS Domain Name System
HTML Hyper Text Markup Language
MIME Multipurpose Internet Mail Extensions
URL Uniform Resoure Loator
IP Internet Protool
TP True Positive
FN False Negative
FP False Positive
TN True Negative
FA False Alarm
CI Corret Identiation
CR Corret Rejetion
TPR True Positive Rate
FPR False Positive Rate
TNR True Negative Rate
FNR False Negative Rate
ROC Reeiving Operating Charateristis
LR Likelihood Ratio
STI Subjetive Tuning Index
SFRG Spam Filter Rationality Graph
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Chapter 1
Introdution
Spam: An unsoliited bulk email.
Spam is a huge and growing problem. The amount of spam that irulates
through the Internet and that gets delivered to email lients is inreasing
day by day, and is aeting everyone on the Internet, ranging from network
providers to Internet Servie Providers (ISPs) and end users. Viewing spam
everyday in the in-box is annoying and time onsuming for all Internet users.
In Nielsen (2008)[1℄ it was found that approximately 97% of the total email
tra onsists of spam. The inreasing amount of spam has attrated the
attention of Internet and seurity experts. As a result many anti spam strate-
gies have been proposed and implemented. Current work also investigates
methods to ompletely blok spam. The reason behind getting attrated to
spam is that spam messages are viewed as a serious threat to the internet,
leading to ooding users' in-boxes, osting users and ISPs with extra time
and money, and beoming a means of doing fraud. Therefore, it beomes
very important to ontain the spam messages over the internet.
1.1 Motivation
The motivation for arrying out this thesis work has been mentioned in the
following sub-subsetion.
1
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1.1.1 Fraud
Sine large numbers of spam messages are reeived by internet users every
day, therefore, spammers employ dierent fraudulent methods to enourage
users to open the spam messages in-order to obtain users private information.
The simplest way to enourage user is to alter the subjet line of the email
in suh a way that implies that the message is not a spam.
There are dierent types of frauds whih are arried out by spammers. For
example, phishing attak and 419 Sams. Phishing is a riminally fraudulent
method that makes an attempt to aquire private information like, redit
ard details, passwords by pretending to be an authenti and trustworthy
entity on the internet. Phishing an be also viewed as a soial engineering
tehnique used to fool users. And 419 Sam is a trik used to take the
reipient in to ondene and persuade the reipient to transfer a sum of
money in hope realizing a signiant larger prot [14, 8℄.
1.1.2 Reipient bearing the ost
The main reason behind the inreasing amount of spam lies in the ost im-
balane between senders and reipients. Sending large amounts of spam has
a very small ost ompared to the relatively high ost of viewing and deleting
a single spam message. Millions of emails an be sent per hour with just 56
kbps of bandwidth[7℄. Aording to[20℄, if even one among 500,000 spam
messages of diret-mail print ampaigns attrats a reipient to buy the prod-
ut then the whole ost inurred in sending 500,000 spams is overed. On
the other hand the reipients and the ISPs have to arry signiant osts.
The most obvious ost is the bandwidth onsumed for proessing spam. In
large organization the harging for Internet onnetions is based on tra,
and beause of spam tra these rms end up paying signiant amounts for
non-produtive tra. On the ISP side the ost omes from wasted band-
width and CPU time. If the onsumption of the bandwidth is signiantly
large due to spam messages (whih is generally the ase) then the senarios
that are faed by the ISP an be ategorized as follows:
1. Inreasing the internet usage harges in order to ompensate the band-
width getting wasted by spam messages.
2. Continuing to provide the internet servie with a slower speed beause
of the spam messages.
3. Absorbing the ost of the wasted bandwidth.
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With these senarios, ISPs generally prefer to go with the 1st i.e. inreasing
the internet usage harges with diretly eets the subsribers. This senario
an also be seen as a ost shift senario where reipients of the spam messages
are paying instead of the ISPs.
1.1.3 Wastage of resoures
Large numbers of spam messages are ausing a severe problem of tra on-
gestion over the network. This leads to signiant level of resoure wastage.
Routers in the network are fored to handle unwanted tra sent to mil-
lions of users. Therefore, apart from user end, resoures are also getting
onsumed in the network. It is problemati to lter spam messages at the
router level. Filtering at the router level also has undesirable impat on
throughput. Sine, spam messages get delivered to respetive reipients it
is regarded as the wastage of network resoures beause spam messages are
normally deleted as they reah their destination.
In addition to this onsidering the time as a resoure it has been found
that signiant amount of time is wasted around spam. For example in a
survey, onduted in 2006 among employees of 500 large ompanies in US and
Finland, it was found that on an average an employee spends 13 minutes of
his daily working time in reading, deleting or replying to spam messages[18℄.
1.1.4 Spam Produes Carbon Dioxide
In [2℄ report it has been found that 62 trillion spam e-mails are sent over
the internet every year. This results in the emission of more than 17 million
tons of arbon dioxide (CO2). It has been found that CO2 related to spam
amounts to 22% of 131 kg, whih is the total CO2 generated by an average
business user. The report says that spam ltering would result in the redu-
tion of spam by 75% whih is equivalent to taking 2.3 millions of ars o the
road. Report is based on the extra energy use spent dealing with spam.
1.1.5 Losing a soliited mail
Some of the mail servers provide limited spae for email in the inbox. In suh
ase if the quota may get exeeded on the daily or weekly basis resulting in
the soliited mail getting rejeted by the spam lter and ending up in the
spam folder. This senario may prove to be very expensive where the ost of
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losing a soliited email is signiantly high.
1.2 Researh Problem
This thesis explores dierent aspets of spam lters, desribing how the per-
formane of a spam lter an be analyzed. In addition to this the thesis will
nd if the spam lter being used is optimal from partiular user point of view
and whether the lter provides positive or negative utility to the user.
It is important to understand, analyze and measure the eetiveness and
eieny of the spam lters in order to improve their quality so that problems
like mentioned in setion 1.1 may be avoided or at some extent redued. In
the ontext of spam lters, "eetiveness"means the degree to whih genuine
spam is deteted and removed. On the other hand, "eieny" means the
degree to whih genuine email messages are orretly delivered. A lter that
removes most spam messages will have high eetiveness, but if it removes
many genuine email messages together with spam messages it will have poor
eieny.
1.3 Methodology of the researh
The methodology of the researh in this thesis is based on Signal Detetion
Theory (SDT). Spam lters are investigated on the basis of SDT.
SDT [12, 4℄ is a model that is suitable for analyzing the eetiveness and
eieny of the spam lters and nding their optimality. SDT provides
a rational basis for deision making under onditions of unertainty. For
example, the question "Is this my dog barking, or is it just the television?"
is a typial situation where SDT an be applied to guide the dog owner to
the most optimal ation, i.e. to ignore the sound, or to go and look after the
dog. Visualization used in SDT makes the deision making even simpler in
situations of unertainty.
A survey has been onduted among students to get the data e-mail data.
This data has been used to alulate the tuning of the spam lter and utility
provided by it.
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1.4 Organization of the report
• Chapter 2- Bakground: This hapter starts with the denition of spam
and ham and then desribes about the eletroni mail system, spam-
ming statistis, tehniques of spamming, measure against spamming
and signal detetion theory.
• Chapter 3- Related work: This hapter desribes about the previous
work done in order to analyze the spam lters.
• Chapter 4- Investigation of spam lters: This hapter analyzes the
eetiveness and eieny of spam lters (Yahoo mail, Gmail, Hotmail,
MS Outlook) using signal detetion theory.
• Chapter 5- Disussion and Comparison among Spam lters: This hap-
ter omparison of the spam lters has been done on the basis of the
results obtained in hapter 4. It also deals with the disussion based
on the analysis of the spam lters.
• Chapter 6- Conlusion and Future work: This hapter onludes this
thesis report with along with the desription of the future work.
Chapter 2
Bakground
This hapter will over the literature behind this thesis. It will explain the
working of the internet mailing system and loophole whih is the root ause
for spamming along with the needed terminologies to properly understand
the topis overed. This hapter will also over the methods adopted by the
spammers for spamming and ountermeasures against spamming. In addition
to this, it also overs the literature about the Signal Detetion Theory (SDT),
whih is used to analyze the spam lters.
2.1 Denition: Spam and Ham
The word spam has been derived from a popular sketh of Monty Python
[10℄. Spam and Ham (non-spam/genuine mail) has been dened in many
ways but the shortest, simple and onvining denition for eah of them is
as follows:
1. Spam: Unsoliited email sent indisriminately in bulk.
2. Ham: Genuine email or email whih is not a spam.
2.2 Eletroni Mail System (e-mail)
Email is a method of reeiving eletroni messages over the internet. This
exhange of messages is done with the help of Simple Mail Transfer Protool
(SMTP). The rst SMTP was published in 1982 as an internet standard 10
(RFC 2821)[3℄.
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2.2.1 Creation of an e-mail
An e-mail is omposed using Mail User Agent (MUA). An e-mail has two
main setions:
• Header: It is omposed of dierent elds suh as sender, reeiver, Car-
bon opy, Blind Carbon Copy, Date and subjet.
• Body: It is the atual unstrutured text message.
Below is a sample e-mail.
from :<mmMihagmail.om>
to :ppPeterhotmail.om
 :ssSmithgmail.om
b :rrRoshangmail.om
date :Sat, May 9, 2009 at 5:54 PM
subjet :Example
mailed-by :gmail.om
This is a sample E-mail. (BODY)
In the above example of the e-mail, in the header, from eld shows the e-mail
address of the sender of the message, to eld shows the e-mail address of the
person to whom the message is sent,  stands for Carbon Copy, this eld
shows the e-mail address of those person who reeive the opy of the e-mail
apart from the main reipient i.e. the reipient mentioned in the to eld. The
eld b stands for Blind Carbon Copy, it shows the e-mail address of the
third type of reipient of the e-mail. In this ase no other reipient is aware
that b'd reipient had also reeived the opy of the e-mail. The date eld
shows the when the e-mail has been sent. The subjet and mailed-by elds
shows about what the message is and whih server is involved in sending the
message, respetively.
2.2.2 Transmission of an e-mail
When the sender presses then send button after omposing the header and
the body of the e-mail using MUA, the e-mail lient on the sender's mahine
onnets to the e-mail server (SMTP server) at the sender's side using port
25. After the onnetion the sender lient interats with the SMTP server
and sends the reeiver's and sender's address along with the body of the
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Figure 2.1: Generi arhiteture of e-mail transmission
message to the SMTP server. Fig.(2.1) shows the general arhiteture of the
transmission of the e-mail over the internet.
SMTP server at this stage takes the reeiver's address and breaks it into two
parts- the reeiver's name ppPeter and the domain name hotmail.om(refer
example e-mail). If the reeiver's address had been at gmail.om then the
sender's SMTP server would have simply handed over the e-mail to POP3
(Post Oe Protool version 3) for gmail.om using Mail Delivery Agent
(MDA) program (MDA is a software that delivers an e-mail just after the
e-mail has been aepted by the server) but the reeiver, in our example, is at
dierent address (hotmail.om) therefore, SMTP server rst ommuniates
with that domain then transfers the e-mail.
The SMTP server onverses with the Domain Name System and asks for the
IP address of the SMTP server for hotmail.om. The DNS replies with IP
address(es). After getting the IP address the sender SMTP server onnets
with the reeiver's SMTP server and transfers the e-mail. The hotmail server
after reeiving the e-mail sends the e-mail to hotmail's POP3 server whih
ultimately puts the e-mail in the reeiver's mail box.
Usually the header of an e-mail indiates the address of the sender and the
reeiver. Therefore, an e-mail an be traked bak to it's root i.e. from where
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it originated. In ase of fake header it beomes diult to trak the e-mail.
2.2.3 SMTP: Cause of Spamming
Spammers don't want to reveal their identity as well as the address from
where the spam originated [17℄. The main reason behind the origin of the
spam is the improper design of the SMTP protool. SMTP protool was de-
veloped when the internet was quite new and was not so widespread, there-
fore, spamming was not a problem at that time. So, these may be the rea-
sons of not implementing any proper anti spam method in SMTP protool.
Though, theoretially it is quite easy to hange the SMTP protool to deal
with spams but pratially it is very diult. The reason for this diulty is
the millions of users who are using this protool daily and this hange annot
happen in very short period of time. Therefore, many solutions of anti spam
strategies have been proposed whih ould work with the SMTP protool
and not within it.
In addition to this, the other problem with the SMTP protool is still a
system based on trust. Anyone submitting the message an laim to be
anyone else with little or no aountability and there is no way to trak bak
the original sender of the message [20℄.
2.3 Spam: Past and Present
The rst spam was sent by Gary Thuerk in 1978 over ARPANET. He sent
a message advertising new model of DEC omputers to 396 people out of
around 2600 people who were on the ARPANET at that time[22℄.
The rst major ommerial spamming was done in 1994, by two lawyers
Laurene Canter and Martha Siegel. By using Usenet posting they advertised
for immigration law servies. The major explosion of spam happened between
2002 to 2004. Spammers in order to improve their nanial ngerprints sent
lot of spam. So muh so that by 2004 the level of spam inreased to more
than 90%, as shown in Fig.(2.2) and after slight derease it again went up to
97% in 2009.
After major rise in the number of spam messages various anti spam laws
were formed but in 2003 US enated CAN-SPAM law [16℄. Under this law
the rst suessful suit was in June 2007 against Jerey A. Kilbride and he
was sentened to 6 years of prison. In 2004, MY DOOM virus was formed
whih is a mass mailing trojan that gave birth to spam sending botnets.
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Situation beame so worse that 90% of spam today is sent by these bots
whih are in millions all over the internet.
Figure 2.2: Spam Level from 2002 to 2009
2.4 Spamming
The proess of spamming involves many sophistiated steps. Eah and every
step is really important from the spammer's point of view in order to deliver
the spam in user's mail box, eventually, beause at some extent spam lters
are also beoming smart to distinguish between a spam and a ham. In the
following sub-setions desribe the proess of spamming in detail.
2.4.1 Proess of Spamming
Spamming ativity has basially three phases. These are as follows:
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• E-mail Harvesting
• Creation of Spam
• Sending of Spam
Eah phase in itself is very hallenging for spammers beause internet seurity
experts are working hard to fail eah and every attempt of spamming. It has
beome a kind of war between spammers and internet seurity experts. Every
time seurity experts ome up with new barrier to stop spam, spammers ome
up with new ideas and strategies to bypass that barrier.
2.4.1.1 Obtaining e-mail ID's
In order to send spam to millions of users spammers needs millions of e-
mail addresses. Spammers an get e-mail addresses by renting,buying and by
harvesting them. The reason behind getting e-mail id's by these ompanies
and spammers is the ommon intentional or unintentional mistakes made by
internet users. Some of these mistakes are - posting on Usenet with e-mail id,
posting on publi forums (disussion groups), subsribing to a website that
goes out of business and selling out the e-mail list of its members, responding
to an opt-out link or e-mail and having an easy guessable e-mail id.
2.4.1.1.1 Renting: The list of the e-mail id's an be rented from the
ompany managing it. In the proess of renting, e-mail ids are not atually
provided to the spammer instead the ompany, at a small harge per e-mail,
sends spams on behalf of the spammer. Renting an e-mail list is typially
heaper than buying but if e-mails are needed repeatedly then renting may
be prove to be expensive. some of the sites whih rent e-mail lists are.
• http://www.postmasterdiret.om
• http://www.horizon-plae.om
• http://www.meesels.om
• http://dire-tel.om
• http://www.optinin.om
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2.4.1.1.2 Buying: Purhasing e-mail list(s) is better than renting if there
is repeated use of it. The pries of lists vary from ompany to ompany
depending on the quality of lists. For Ex. if the list if quite old then it will
have low delivery rate and hene, the ost of the list will be low. Those
ompanies whih sell lassied e-mail lists suh as based on business type
and geographial loation, harge more beause list may oer more delivery
rates.
2.4.1.1.3 Harvesting: E-mail harvesting is a proess of sanning e-mail
ids over the internet using an appliation. These e-mail harvesters are auto-
mated tools whih analyzes the internet data to nd ertain patterns whih
math the pattern of an e-mail id. To nd an e-mail id the appliation may
san HTML soure for dierent tags like mal From: and mail To:. Searh
engines an also be used by e-mail harvesters to return speied pages whih
harvesters an san for e-mail ids.
2.4.1.2 Creation of Spam
The spam is omposed in a way to ath the attention of the user and ompel
him to respond to the e-mail (spam). Sine, these days users have beome
autious of spam and austomed to delete the spam as soon as they see it.
Therefore, it is hallenge for spammers to ompose a spam message whih
ould lure the user to open it or to visit speied site.
Before reahing to the user mailbox spam has to deeive the lter. Spam
should be omposed in suh a way so that lter should lassify it as a ham.
Some of the tehniques of reation of spam message whih spammers use are
desribed as follows:
2.4.1.2.1 Blank HTML: Blank HTML e-mail messages are the messages
whih do not ontain any plain text. The message ontains an image whih
is very hard for a spam lter to parse beause signiant amount of artiial
intelligene would be required to parse suh an image. Example of blank
HTML has been shown in Fig.(2.3)
Figure 2.3: Ex. of Invisibility- using blank HTML
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2.4.1.2.2 Invisible Text: Invisible text is a textual ontent whih a user
an not see but the spam lter an easily read. Tehniques involved in making
the text invisible attempt to hide valid text inside a message to make it appear
a valid message. The reason behind hiding the text by the spammers is that
many the spam lters alulate perentage and make the deision, whether
an inoming e-mail is spam or ham, on the basis of number of spam words
rather than ham words. Therefore inlusion of suh texts, having random
words, would oset the perentage to the level where the spam lter onsiders
any inoming e-mail to be of an aeptable type for the delivery.
The tehniques to hide the text, inlude the inlusion of real random numbers
or text or both before HTML begins as shown in the Fig.(2.4).
Figure 2.4: Ex. of Invisibility- using data before HTML
Words an also be seretly inluded whih makes the spam look like ham by
writing white text on a white bakground, as shown in the Fig.(2.5).
Figure 2.5: Ex. of Invisibility- using white text on white bakground
Another method to hide the text is by using the header elds as shown in
Fig.(2.6).
Figure 2.6: Ex. of Invisibility- using header
2.4.1.2.3 SplittingWords: Many spam lters use orpus of words whih
help in lassifying a message as spam or ham. Empty HTML tags an be used
with split words so that the spam ould not detet it as single word, whih is
atually a single word but it an be deteted by a human eye. Therefore, in
order to be eetive spam lters should be knowledgable enough to under-
stand HTML very well. An example of split words with HTML tags is shown
in Fig.(2.7).
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Figure 2.7: Split words with HTML
2.4.1.2.4 Bogus HTML Tags: Insertion of bogus HTML tags is quite
eetive way to aomplish the purpose of spammers beause some spam
lters may not be able to parse the message due to large amount of text
that is not properly formatted. Fig.(2.8) desribes an example of inserting
invalid HTML tags with large amount of data. The main objetive behind
suh insertion as desribed in the paragraph of invisible text, is to hamper
the lter's ability to distinguish between spam and ham.
Figure 2.8: Invalid HTML tags with large amount of text
2.4.1.2.5 Vertial Hiding: A Spammer an hide the words by using
HTML table. Aording to this tehnique words a printed vertially in the
table instead of horizontally, as shown in the Fig.(2.9). For the user the
output will meaningful but for the spam lter it will only be fragments of
words. In the gure the output (bottom part) shows how the message would
be displayed to the user but eah strip(HFT, EIH,..) shown in the output
is plaed in the table as shown in the upper part of the gure.
2.4.1.2.6 MIME Partition: A MIME doument is separated in two parts,
one HTML part and the other plain text. Spammers exploit this funtionality
by plaing an invalid text in the setion of the plain text, whih is generally
never displayed and plaing a spam message in the HTML setion. The spam
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Figure 2.9: Vertial hiding of the text
lters generally parse the message as a single message and therefore, if the
invalid message sueeds in having more likelihood value of being a ham
than the message in the HTML setion have of being a spam then the whole
message would deeive the lter and pass through it. Fig.(2.10) shows the
exploitation of partition of MIME doument.
Figure 2.10: MIME doument partition exploitation
2.4.1.2.7 Charater and Spae Triks: By plaing spaes in between
the haraters spammer an fool spam lters. For example in Fig.(2.11) the
spam lter would read the word M O N E Y as M<spae>O<spae>N<spae>E<
spae>Y. Even if the spaes are replaed by any other haraters, as shown
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in the seond line of same gure, the spam lter would still be not able to
parse it and would allow the message to pass through it like a ham.
Figure 2.11: Example of harater and spae triks
2.4.1.2.8 URL Hiding: Spammers use several tehniques in order to
hide the URL as shown in the Fig.(2.12). First line in the gure shows 32 bit
enoding of URL, seond line shows hexa deimal enoding of URL, third line
shows otal enoding of URL and the fourth line shows the URL as a ombi-
nation of password and IP address before and after  and HTML page name
innite.htm. The advantage of hiding of the URL is to avoid the mathing
with the URL's that are present in the database of the spam lter.
Figure 2.12: Example of hidden URL's
2.4.1.2.9 JavaSript: Sine many spam lters do not have the funtion-
ality of JavaSript parser therefore, lter ignores the JavaSript and allows
the message to pass through it. This loophole is exploited the spammers by
plaing the entire spam message inside the JavaSript. Therefore, in order
to avoid suh spamming proper deoding of JavaSript is needed.
2.4.1.3 Sending of Spam
After getting the list of e-mail addresses and having the spam message om-
posed, the spammer sends the message to the olleted addresses, using one
of the many mass mailer tools. In the proess of spam sending the spammer
avoids getting traked bak beause spam sending violates the terms of ser-
vie of internet servie providers (ISP's) and therefore omplaints of spam
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sending generally results in the termination of the aount of the sender. The
point of origin of the spam message is onealed using Open Relays or Open
Proxies.
2.4.1.3.1 Open Relays: Open relays are SMTP servers over the internet
whih are designed in suh a way that they transfer an e-mail to and from
anyone and not just an e-mail destined to and from the users in the server
database. For example, normally server for A.om would aept an e-mail
only from addresses at A.om but Open relays would also aept an e-mail
for B.om and then would ontat the B.om server to deliver the mail. Open
relays exist for many reasons, some users use it beause of the rewalls.
Open relays had been abused a lot by spammers in the past but now it has
beome less ommon now. Many ISP's use DNS based bloking lists to not
allow the mails from Open relays. If any mail server is deteted of allowing
e-mails to pass through them on the behalf of some third party then that mail
server would be added to the bloking list and in future would get rejeted,
by the severs using that bloking list, for sending any e-mails. Open relay
tehnique for spamming has ome to an extintion therefore spammers have
adopted other tehniques of spamming like botnets. Botnet is the olletion
of infeted omputers whih work autonomously and automatially whih
the spammers use to send spam.
2.4.1.3.2 Open Proxies: Proxy servers are the servers whih are de-
signed in suh a way that they bypass rewalls. Proxy servers are designed
for those users who are behind the rewalls. The misongured proxy servers
an be abused by spammers with the help of the ommand, HTTP CONNECT.
Unlike Open relays in proxy server it is quite impossible to nd out the
orret origin of the e-mail. Therefore, proxy servers are preferred by the
spammers. Open proxies are also reated using viruses whih then spam-
mers abuse by sending spam. The open proxies reated by the viruses are
very hard to detet.
2.4.2 Measures against spamming
There are two dierent ways to stop spam.
• Non Filtering Tehniques: These tehniques try to stop spam by pre-
venting bulk e-mailers. For example, by harging for every e-mail whih
is sent or by restriting aess to e-mail servers for spammers.
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• Filtering Tehniques: These tehniques are used after the spam mes-
sages are sent by the spammer. Filtering tehniques detet and sepa-
rates spam from ham before e-mail gets delivered to the user.
2.4.2.1 Non ltering tehniques
Non ltering tehniques an be ategorized into three parts:(1) Prevention
System (2) Time based System and (3) Money based System.
2.4.2.1.1 Prevention System: Spam prevention is the diret way to
stop spam. This an be done by losing all open relays over the internet and
by strengthening SMTP protool that would fore the sender to go through
the authentiation proess to trak the origin of the spam. This fores bulk
e-mailers to send spam through their own ISP's, but relies on these ISP's to
blok their aounts. This approah of stopping spam goes against the prin-
iples of the internet. Moreover this approah is not suient as spammers
have now started using open proxies whih hides the plae of origin of the
message. In addition to this haked omputers are also used for spamming.
2.4.2.1.2 Time based System: This is one of the eonomi solutions.
Aording to the this solution the sender of the message is fored to spend
some time for Ex. in solving some problem before he an send the message.
This problem is moderately expensive funtion, alled a priing funtion[13℄.
The idea behind this solution is to waste the omputer time in order to
disourage the spammer from spamming. For a legitimate internet user it
is not very expensive in terms of omputer time to send an e-mail but for
spammers who send millions of e-mails it would take signiant amount of
time to send spam. Therefore, it makes it tough for the spammer to send
large amount of messages in an aeptable time.
This tehnique has not been yet inorporated in the internet. Even if it
would be there, it is hard to tell how muh will it sueed in pratie. Issues
related with this tehnique are:
• This feature has to be inorporated into the Internet whih is not easy.
• There is the problem of hardware bakward ompatibility. A user using
an old omputer must be able to send an email in a reasonable amount
of time. This rules out the use of too ostly priing funtions. But
then for a spammer using modern hardware, the ost in time to send a
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message may beome almost equal to zero. It seems impossible to nd
a priing funtion that suits both needs.
2.4.2.1.3 Money based System: The signiant heapness of sending
large amount of spam is the main motivation fator for spammers. Money
based solution was proposed in order to disourage spammers.
Money based System this is also an eonomi solution. The main idea behind
this solution is to harge the sender some amount of money for eah e-mail.
Basially this is based on hannelised e-mail system where the sender has
to pay to the reipient, before the reipient reads the e-mail arriving on
spei hannel[13℄. The payment an be in the form of eletroni ash to
automate the proess. Sine, spammers send large amount of spam therefore
this tehnique may make it unpleasant for them to send spam.
There are some issues with money based system like presently there is no
global eletroni ash system and the other major onern is the adoption of
the system by the user (assuming the system is present and working).
2.4.2.2 Filtering Tehniques
Filter based tehniques against spam an be divided into two ategories:
1. Cooperative Filtering: This kind of ltering would require ooperation
between spammers and the reipient of spam. Cooperative Filtering
would also require implementation of set of standards all over the net-
work and adhering to those standards in order to identify spam. This
kind of ltering is less likely to work beause spammers try to hide the
plae of origin of spam.
2. Heuristi Filtering (Rule based ltering): Heuristi Filtering on the
other hand works without any ooperation with spam originators and
assumes that it is possible to detet and lassify spam from ham.
Sine the ooperative ltering is less likely to work therefore following part of
this subsubsetion will disuss about only heuristi ltering. Heuristi based
ltering an be lassied in to three ategories: List based ltering, Tra
analysis based ltering and Content based ltering.
2.4.2.2.1 List Based Filtering: List based lters work on the idea of
ategorizing the sender of the e-mail as a spammer or a non-spammer (trusted
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user) and then stop spam by bloking or allowing e-mails aordingly. List
Based Filtering is also alled Origin Based Filtering as e-mails aording to
this tehnique are ltered before getting to the user's omputer. Following
are the lists used for ltering e-mails.
Blaklist:
Blaklist is the most prominent and popular method to stop spam. It on-
tains the list of e-mail address and IP (Internet Protool) addresses whih
previously have been involved in spamming. When any e-mail arrives, the
spam lter heks to nd our if the IP address or the e-mail address of the
inoming e-mail is in the balklist. If the spam lter nds out math the
e-mail is lassied as spam and rejeted.
Blaklist an also sometime misidentify a legitimate sender as spammer be-
ause blaklists an be bypassed by relaying mail through the SMTP servers
of the legitimate users that are not on the blaklist. Another disadvantage
is that spammers routinely swith IP addresses and e-mail addresses to hide
their traks therefore, a blaklist may not ath newest sapmming ases.
Whitelist:
Whitelist makes an attempt to stop spam using method whih is just opposite
to that of a blaklist. Unlike blaklist, whitelist ontains the IP addresses
and e-mail addresses of the users who are allowed to send the e-email and
others are rejeted by default. These addresses are plaed on a trusted user
list. In order to enable the legitimate sender to reah the reipient, the
whitelist based system will send a request for onrmation to the sender and
the sender is supposed to reply in spei short period of time.
The whitelist is generally used along with another ltering tehnique in order
to redue the number of ham that aidentally get lassied as spam. If just
whitelist is used by the spam lter then eah and every ham sent by unknown
legitimate users (not on the whitelist) will be lassied as spam.
There is also an automati way of reating a whitelist. Aording to this
method, sender addresses is heked against the blaklist; if the sender has
no history of spamming then his addresses added to the whitelist after drop-
ping the e-mail to the intended mailbox.
Greylist:
Greylist spam ltering tehnique in omparison with blaklist and whitelist
is newer. It takes the advantage of the fat that spammers generally attempt
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to send a bath of spam only one. Greylist based system initially rejets
the message from an unknown sender and sends a failure notie to the sender
server. If the sender server attempts to send the message again (whih is done
by most legitimate servers) then the Greylist based system assumes that the
message is not a spam and hene delivers the message to the reipient's inbox.
In addition to this, the system will add the e-mail address or the IP address
of the sender to the to the Greylist.
One of the disadvantage of Greylist lters is that they may delay the deliv-
ery of the e-mail whih an be sometimes inonvenient when any partiular
e-mail is expeted urgently.
Real-Time Blakhole List:
The Real-Time Blakhole List tehnique works in quite similar manner as
blaklist but requires less hands-on maintenane. The reason behind this is
the maintenane of most of the real-time blakhole lists third parties. These
third parties build blaklists on the behalf of their subsribers. Aording
to this tehnique eah time the spam lter reeives an e-mail it onnets to
the third party system and then ompares the sender's address against the
Real-Time Blakhole List.
Blakhole lists are large and updated regularly therefore, there is no need
to spend time manually inluding new IP addresses in the list, to inrease
the probability of the spamlter to ath the newest spam sam. The disad-
vantage of real-time blakhole lists is that like blaklist it may also lassify
ham as spam if spammers happen to use a legitimate IP address as a similar
passage for spam.
2.4.2.2.2 Content Based Filtering: Content based ltering tehnique
is used after the full reeption of the message (inluding the body of the mes-
sage). Some of the Content based ltering tehniques are mentioned below.
Key word based ltering:
Key word based spam lters are the simplest type of ontent based lters.
These lters rejet e-mails that ontain ertain words. The idea behind this
tehnique is that most spammers do not use words that are used in personal
or business ommuniation. Hene, it an be used to ght spam, inspite of
being the simplest.
But the disadvantage with this tehnique is that if the spam lter is on-
gured to detet e-mails with more ommon words then this may lassify
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ham as spam. Key word based lters should be updated regularly beause
spammers quite often misspell the key words in order to fool the spam lter
and pass through it.
Sore based ltering:
Sore based lters are more advane than Keyword based lters beause
instead of bloking e-mails that have suspiious words sore based lters
take into aount multiple words in an e-mail. Sore based lters sans an
inoming e-mail and assigns a spei sore (points) to words and phrases.
Words that are found quite frequently in spam messages like 'Viagra' 'free
redit' would reeive higher sores than those words whih are found in ham
messages. The total sore is alulated by adding up all the points. If
the e-mail reeives ertain sore or higher (determined by the anti-spam
appliation's administrator), the e-mail is lassied as spam and e-mails that
reeive low sore than the target sore are delivered to the users inboxes.
Sore based lters are quite eetive and also minimize delay but may also
result in lassifying spam as ham if lter nds ertain ombination of words
in an e-mail sent by legitimate user. In addition to this, spammers may also
learn to avoid ertain words thereby deeiving the spam spam lters.
Naïve Bayesian ltering:
Bayesian ltering tehnique is the most advaned form of ontent-based l-
tering. It uses the laws of mathematial probability to lassify spam from
ham. Before the Bayesian lter starts funtioning, they are trained with a set
of spam and a set of ham, by manually agging eah message as either spam
or ham. The lter makes two list one for ham and another for spam. When
e-mails are reeived by the lter it sans e-mails (ham+spam) for words and
phrases and adds them to the respetive lists.
In order to hek whether an e-mail is spam, the Bayesian lter sans the
e-mail and looks for ertain words and phrases and then ompares them
against the list for spam and the list for ham to nd out the probability that
the message is spam. For example, if the e-mail ontains the word "Viagra"
and it appears 50 times in spam list but it only appears 5 times in ham list,
then there is 91% hane that the inoming e-mail is a spam.
Bayesian lter regularly builds its lists on the basis of e-mails reeived by the
user therefore, lter beomes more eetive the longer it's used.
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2.5 Signal Detetion Theory
This setion presents a model for analyzing spam lters based on SDT (Signal
Detetion Theory)[12, 4, 11, 23℄. SDT is based on probability theory and is
an eetive means to analyze ambiguous data. In the SDT framework eah
event is assumed to be either:
• signal (from a known proess) or
• noise (from an unknown proess)
SDT provides a formal framework for setting optimal thresholds for distin-
guishing between signal and noise. For example, in radar system the operator
tries to determine from the display on the radar sreen whether it is a sig-
nal (airraft) or a noise (bird or something else), and setting the optimal
deisioin threshold is importane for the suess of military operations.
SDT assumes that signal and noise distributions overlap eah other and that
an observed stimulus may ome from any side of the distribution. In ad-
dition to this SDT also assumes that the signal is added to the noise and
that the deision maker behaves rationally and tries to nd out the optimal
performane.
Fig.(2.13) shows the SDT model with the two distributions (signal and noise)
assuming that both distributions are normal with equal standard deviations.
The X-axis / horizontal axis represents the strength of the internal response
(also alled hidden variable, deision variable or internal variable) whih is
a funtion of the external observed stimulus. The internal response gives
the information about the event. The Y-axis / vertial axis represents the
probability of the internal response. These distributions are used in the
proess of making the deision whether the stimulus represents signal or noise.
The vertial line between the two distributions is the deision riterion for
the internal response that is used to make a deision. The deision riterion
is xed and is dened on the basis of the hidden variables.
In the proess of deision making any internal response with a value less
than the value of the deision riterion is determined to ome from the noise
distribution while an internal response with a value greater than the value
of the deision riterion is determined to ome from the signal distribution.
The overlap between noise and signal distributions results in four possible
deisions as shown in Fig.(2.14).
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Figure 2.13: SDT model showing overlap between signal and noise distribu-
tion
• False Negative (FN): Stimulus oming from the signal distribution in-
orretly deteted as noise
1
.
• True Positive (TP): Stimulus oming from the signal distribution or-
retly deteted as signal
2
.
• False Positive (FP): Stimulus oming from the noise distribution inor-
retly deteted as signal
3
.
• True Negative (TN): Stimulus oming from the noise distribution or-
retly deteted as noise
4
.
FP and FN are also known as Type I error and Type II errors respetively
in statistis. The SDT deision making method is based on the onepts of
TP Rate and FP Rate. The TP Rate is the total number of times a genuine
signal is deteted as signal divided by the total number of genuine signals.
Hene, it an be alulated as follows:
TP Rate =
TP
TP + FN
(2.1)
1
Called "Miss" in SDT terminology.
2
Called "Hit" in SDT terminology.
3
Called "False Alarm" or "FA" in SDT terminology.
4
Called "Corret Identiation" or "CI" or "Corret Rejetion" or "CR"in SDT termi-
nology.
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Figure 2.14: The model of SDT showing TP,FN,FP and TN
The FP Rate is the total number of times genuine noise is deteted as signal,
divided by the total number of genuine noise instanes. Hene the FP Rate
an be alulated using the following formula:
FP Rate =
FP
FP + TN
(2.2)
It an be noted that the sum of the TP and FN Rates, as well as the sum of
the FP and TN Rates both are equal to 1. This an be expressed as:


FN Rate = 1− TP Rate
TN Rate = 1− FP Rate
(2.3)
Fig.(2.15) illustrates the analysis of TP and FP rates. The lower half of gure
sets the deision riterion at the left-most edge of the signal distribution.
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Figure 2.15: SDT model showing showing riterion at two dierent plaes:
FP Rates=0% and TP Rates=100%
Statistially, it means that the TP Rate is 100%.
Let us assume the example of a dotor who makes the deision whether there
is a tumor in the brain based on the internal response of a brain san. If
the value of the deision riterion is lowered suh that the TP Rate is 100%
then the FP Rate also inreases as shown in the lower half of Fig.(2.15). The
dotor will therefore never miss a real tumor, but a negative side-eet of
inreasing TP Rate is a orresponding inrease in the FP rate. In ase value
of the deision riterion is inreased to the rightmost edge of the noise dis-
tribution as shown in the upper half of Fig.(2.15) then the FP Rate beomes
0%, but at the same time the TP Rate also gets very low. This means that
the dotor gets no false alarms, but will miss many real tumors.
SDT assumes that it is pratially impossible to simultaneously have a 100%
TP Rate and 0% FP Rate beause of the overlap between the signal and the
noise distributions. STD oers a method for dening the deision riterion
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Figure 2.16: Showing ROC urves
value whih will result in optimal deision making. In this paper we use STD
and Bayesian methods for analyzing spam lters.
2.5.1 ROC: Reeiver Operating Charateristis
After the deision have been made by the deision maker, four types of
results are obtained as desribed earlier in this hapter. Reeiving Operating
Charateristis or just ROC urve [21℄ an be used to all the four types of
results.
ROC is a graphial plot of TP rate Vs. FP rate as shown in the Fig(2.16).
ROC urve hanges as the value of the deision riterion is varied. It shows
the omparison of two operating harateristis: TP rate and FP rate.
In the Fig(2.16), D0, D1, D2 and D3 shows the distane that is the amount
of overlap between the two distributions (signal and noise). For eah of
the distane it shows that as the value of the deision riterion dereases or
inreases the rate of FP and TP hanges aordingly. It an also be notied
that for reasonable value of deision riterion the TP rate is always higher
than the FP rate.
The shape of the ROC urve depends on the the noise and signal distribu-
tions. The more overlap between the distributions, the more the shape of the
ROC urve will be a straight line at 45 deegrees angle. The more distint the
distributions, the more the ROC urve will hange angle. A spei point
on the urve alled the likelihood ratio (LR) depends on a ertain deision
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riterion. The LR has been explained in the following subsetion.
2.5.2 Likelihood Ratio
The likelihood ratio (LR) is the ratio of TP rate and the FP rate. LR is
alulated using the following formula:
LR =
TP Rate
FP Rate
(2.4)
LR in the ROC urve represents one of the points on the urve. Likelihood
ratio is very important in signal detetion theory as it has many things to
oer for Ex. it gives a general and prinipled basis for the proess of deision
making. It suggests what the observer may be doing in making a judgment
and the most important harateristi is that the LR makes the optimal use
of the information.
Signal Detetion Theory says that in order to nd the optimal value of the
deision riterion for a partiular user i.e. in order to maximize the utility
for the partiular user, the following equation should be satised:
LR =
P (noise)
P (signal)
· Benet of TN + Cost of FP
Benet of TP + Cost of FN
(2.5)
The left side of the Eq.(2.5) dependent on the base rate probabilities of the
stimulus being signal or noise, and also on the osts of inorret and the ben-
ets of orret detetion and it is alulated by multiplying the ratio of the
base rate probability of noise P (noise) and the base rate probability of signal
P (signal) with the ratio of the ost of error and benet of orret identi-
ation. Note that for every stimulus, the equation P (noise) + P (signal) = 1
holds.
Chapter 3
Related Work
In the ontext of spam ltering, genuine (non-spam) email messages are
ommonly alled "ham". Sine spam lters are trying to identify spam, a
message identied as spam is alled a "positive". A ham message inorretly
lassied as spam therefore represents an instane of false positive (FP), and
a spam message identied as ham represents a false negative (FN).
Various analyzes of the performane of spam lters have been done in pre-
vious studies. The eetiveness of a spam lter is aeted by the domain in
whih it is used. For example the ost of a lost genuine email message inor-
retly deteted as spam will depend on the reipient's (and sender's) business
area, as well as on the reipient's (and sender's) pereption, attitude and level
of frustration.
Some of the methods of analyzing spam lters whih have been proposed are
desribed in the following setions.
3.1 Error Based Funtion
Amethod for analyzing spam lters was proposed by Garia et al. in 2004 [9℄.
Garia's analysis was restrited to open soure lters, and only onsidered
ontent based lters, i.e. not for example blak/white lists. Aording to [9℄
both FN rate and FP rate an not be 0 at the same time therefore, intention
was to rank the performane of spam lters on the basis of FN and FP rates
beause a good spam lter will have low FN and FP rate.
This method of analysis took into onsideration FP as an error and FN as an
indiator of eetiveness of the spam lter.Garia et al. a proposed funtion
29
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'W' for alulating a single measure of a lter's error rate as a funtion of its
false positive and false negative rates.
W (FN_rate, FP_rate) = (FP_rate+ ǫ)2(FN_rate+ ǫ)
where ǫ=.01 (onstant).
The main idea is to tolerate small amount of FPs for signiant amount of
derease in FNs.
3.2 Preision (P) and Reall (R)
Another approah to analyzing spam lter performane is through the Pre-
ision and Reall metris. This method was extensively used for spam lter
lassiation in [19℄.
Preision is the ratio of spam messages lassied as spam relative to the total
number of messages lassied as spam.
Reall is the ratio of spam messages lassied as spam relative to the total
number of spam messages. For example, if 5 out of 10 spam messages are
orretly identied as spam then the Reall rate is 0.5. As long as no ham
messages are lassied as spam the Preision will be 1, but as soon as some
ham messages are inorretly lassied as spam the Preision will fall below
1. Therefore, formally, if:
• N1=Number of spam lassied as spam
• N2=Number of spam lassied as ham
• N3=Number of ham lassied as ham
• N4=Number of ham lassied as spam
then the formula for Preision and Reall an be written as follows:
P =
N1
N1 + N4
R =
N1
N1 + N2
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For spam lters, an instane of FP is normally onsidered more problem-
ati than an instane of FN. Preision whih reets a lter's FP property
is therefore onsidered to be a more important measure than Reall whih
reets the lter's FN property. The Preision value therefore needs to be
higher than the Reall value, but at the same time there should be a proper
balane between the two values. Therefore, spam lters with higher preision
value are onsidered good.
3.3 Weighted Auray
Another proposed method for measuring the eetiveness of spam lters
is Weighted Auray whih uses the auray and error rate as measures.
Weighted auray 'W' of a spam ler an be alulated as:
W =
λ · N3 + N1
λ ·Nh + Ns
where Nh and Ns are the total number of ham and spam messages respe-
tively.
Equal relative weight (λ) is assigned to the error types FP (False Positive)
and FN (False Negative), as well as to the orret lassiation types. An
instane of FP ounts λ times an instane of FN. An instane of TN (True
Negative), i.e. a orret lassiation of a genuine email message, ounts λ
times an instane of TP (true positive), i.e. a orret lassiation of spam.
This method reets that an instane of FP is λ times more ostly than an
instane of FN [6℄.
3.4 10-fold ross validation
Cross validation tehnique is a straightforward way of nding out the ee-
tiveness of a spam lter [15℄.
Aording to this tehnique data set 'm' is splitted into 10 mutually exlusive
parts 'm1, m2,...m10' of approximately equal size. The induer is trained and
tested on m/mi and against mi, 10 times respetively, with dierent i's (i=1,
2,..10).
At last the performane of the spam lter is alulated by taking the average
of total number of tests. For 10-fold ross validation the preision 'P' and
reall 'R' 3.2 an be alulated as follows:
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P =
1
n
·
10∑
i=1
Pi
R =
1
n
·
10∑
i=1
Ri
where Pi is a preision for eah of the 10 tests and Ri is a reall for eah of
the 10 tests.
Chapter 4
Investigating Spam Filters
In this hapter it has been desribed that how Signal detetion theory an be
applied to investigate the spam lters. Charateristis of a spam lters have
been analyzed in detail using SDT. In addition to this, this hapter analyzes
spam lters of some of the most popular webmail servies like Gmail, Yahoo
Mail, Hotmail and Mirosoft Outlook (Exhange Server).
4.1 Spam Filter Analysis Using SDT
Spam lters are used to separate spam from ham. A spam lter arries
out this separation using dierent tehniques. For example, ontent based
ltering [9℄ is done by analyzing the body of the message. Origin based
ltering[9℄ is done by judging the soure of the message. SDT an be used
to analyze the spam lters based on a single tehnique as well as lters
based on multiple tehnique like those used by email servie providers like:
Gmail, Yahoo mail and Hotmail. First single tehnique spam lters after
that multiple tehnique spam lters are disussed.
4.1.1 Spam Filters Based on Single Tehnique
When applying SDT to spam lter analysis, we will use the terminology
onvention that:
• an instane of spam is onsidered as a signal
• an instane of ham is onsidered as noise
33
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Within the SDT framework, the diulty of distinguishing between spam
and ham inreases with the degree of overlap between the two distributions,
as would be expeted. The overlap between spam and ham distributions
results in two types of inorret and two types of orret deisions, dened
as:
1. Ham lassied as ham (TN)
2. Spam lassied as ham (FN)
3. Spam lassied as spam (TP)
4. Ham lassied as spam (FP)
The 3rd and 4th outomes are important from the SDT point of view as
they are used in the mathematial expressions. In the following S denotes a
genuine spam message, and S ′ denotes an assumed spam message. Similarly,
H denotes a genuine ham message, and H ′ denotes an assumed ham message.
The four possible outomes of the spam lter are shown in Fig. 4.1. P (S ′|S),
P (H ′|S), P (S ′|H) and P (H ′|H) in the Fig. 4.1 represents the four ondi-
tional probabilities.
Figure 4.1: Deision Matrix for a spam lter showing four possible ases
All the four possible ases are dependent on eah other. For example, when
the message really is spam (1st row) the proportion of TP and FN add up
to 1 beause the lter an only respond in one of the two ways- either Yes
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or No. Likewise when the message really is ham (2nd row), the proportion
of FP and TN add up to 1. Thus all the information in the deision matrix
an be obtained from TP and FP. Therefore we have
P (H ′|S) = 1− P (S ′|S)
(4.1)
P (H ′|H) = 1− P (S ′|H)
(4.2)
The onditional probabilities P (S ′|S) and P (S ′|H) represent the TP and
FP rates respetively. The TP rate indiates the suessful ltering of spam
messages, and an therefore be used to analyze the eetiveness of the spam
lter. The FP rate on the other hand shows errors whih an be used to de-
termine the eieny of spam lters. Eieny an be inreased by reduing
the FP rate. The eetiveness of the spam lter inreases as the TP rate
gets loser to 1 and the eieny inreases as the FP rate gets loser to 0.
It an be easily onluded that spam lters will behave in the best way
when the TP rate is maximum and the FP rate is minimum. Pratially
no automated spam lter an be both 100% eetive and 100% eient at
the same time. The reason for this is of ourse that lever omposition of
spam messages give them similar harateristis to ham messages. For auto-
mated lters that do not have the same ognitive and semanti apabilities
as humans, separation between ham and spam is not always possible.
4.1.1.1 Atual LR and Optimal LR
After the reeiving the four types of results in the inbox and spam folder
it an be alulated that the output produed by the spei lter provides
negative or positive utility to the partiular user.
Spam lters makes use of the TP rate and the FP rate to alulate the LR
(Likelihood Ratio). The formula to alulate the LR is as follows:
LR = TPrate
FPrate
= P (S
′|S)
P (S′|H)
(4.3)
We an all the LR in the Eq.(4.3) as the Atual LR as it has been alulated
from the atual data after the ltering of the e-mails.
In order to nd the utility for spei user the atual LR is ompared with
the value in the Eq.(4.4). We have named the value in the equation 4.4
as the Optimal LR = LR' beause it is used to nd out whether the spam
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lter provides the positive utility to the user or not. If the spam lter is not
optimal for the user then it is tuned for optimality.
LR′ =
P (H)
P (S)
· (BH′|H + CS′H)
(BS′|S + CH′|S)
(4.4)
where P (H) and P (S) represent the base rate probabilities of ham and spam
in the message set.
The additivity P (H) + P (S) = 1 always holds.
In the above equation BH′|H denotes the benet assoiated with TN, and
BS′|S denotes the benet assoiated with TP. Similarly CS′|H denotes the
ost assoiated with FP, and CH′|S denotes the ost assoiated with FN.
In the Eq.(4.4) LR'
1
has been alulated using the base rate probabilities of
ourrene of spam messages in a representative set of messages and the ost
assoiated with inorret deisions and the benets assoiated with orret
deisions. The LR' varies from one user to another beause the osts and
benets involved in reeiving an e-mail is dierent for dierent users.
In Eq.(4.4) if the ost of errors is the same as the benets of orret responses
as shown in the Eq.(4.5)
(BH′|H + CS′|H) = (BS′|S + CH′|S) (4.5)
then the LR' beomes equal to the fration of base rate probabilities of spam
and ham. This an be written mathematially as follows:
LR′ =
P (H)
P (S)
From empirial researhes [19, 6, 5℄ it has been found that the base rate
probability of spam aets the detetion of spam. The base rate probability
will therefore inuene the deision riterion value of the lter.
The ost of FP is normally signiantly higher than the ost of FN. People
are normally more onerned about the loss of a ham that about reeiving a
spam. With the help of Eq.(4.6) dierent aspets of the spam lter an be
evaluated and analyzed.
While omparing LR and LR' the rule for assessing the value of the spam
lter is as follows:
1
The formula has been derived taking into aount + and - signs but wherever else ost
and benets will be used they will be used with appropriate signs
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LR = LR' (4.6)
As desribed in subsetion 2.5.1, in the ROC urve a partiular point on the
urve is determine by the deision riterion, whih is the atual LR.
Like atual LR, the optimal LR an also be plaed on the same urve and
the optimal deision riterion is said to be obtained when both the points
are same as shown below:
LR = LR'
(P (S ′|S), P (S ′|H)) = (P (H) · (BH′|H + CS′|H), P (S) · (BS′|S + CH′|S))
(4.7)
In this situation the spam lter would behave optimally for the spei user.
If the spam ler is does not works in an optimal way for the user then it
should be tuned taking in to onsideration ertain parameters. Therefore, it
an be onluded that Atual LR is a funtion of tuning parameters. It an
be represented mathematially as follows:
LR = f(x)
where, x = Tuning Parameters
(4.8)
The value of x in the Eq.(4.8) will hange eah time the spam ler is tuned
with new parameters.
4.1.2 Subjetive Tuning Index
Based on the onepts developed in the previous setions we will here dene
the Subjetive Tuning Index, or STI for short. This index expresses the
degree of optimality of the tuning of a partiular spam lter when seen from
a spei user's point of view. This means that the utility of having a spam
lter is maximized as a funtion of ost and benet of inorret and orret
ltering.
From here onwards BH′|H = UH′|H , CS′|H = US′|H, BS′|S = US′|S, CH′|S =
UH′|S beause we will talk in terms of utility.
The optimal likelihood ratio and the atual likelihood ratio are determined
by their respetive points on the ROC urve of Fig.(2.16). A spam lter is
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tuned optimally when the two points are in the same position. The loser
the points, the more optimal the tuning, and the further apart, the worse the
tuning. Below we speify the STI as the distane in the plane of the ROC
urve. Let σ represent the STI:
Denition 1 (Subjetive Spam Filter Utility Index)
σ =
√
(P (S ′|S)−P (H)(UH′|H +US′|H))2 + (P (S ′|H)−P (S)(US′|S+UH′|S))2√
2
(4.9)
The maximum distane between two points in Fig.(2.16) would be
√
2. In
order to let σ take a value in the range [0, 1] the normalization fator 1/
√
2
is used in Eq.(4.9).
We an use the value of σ to analyze the tuning of a spam lter. The smaller
the value, the better the spam lter is tuned. In ase σ = 0, the spam lter
for a given user is perfetly tuned. When σ 6= 0 it means that the spam lter
is not tuned aording to the needs of the user.
Whether the spam lter atually provides positive or negative utility, and
how muh utility is providers to the user is not diretly indiated by the STI
σ. The utility U is given by the expression below.
U=P (S)·[P (S ′|S)·US′|S+P (H ′|S)·UH′|S]+P (H)·[P (H ′H)·UH′|H+P (S ′|H)·US′|H ]
(4.10)
The overall utility U will depend on the probabilities of the various outomes
and their respetive utilities.
4.1.3 Spam Filters Based on Multiple Tehniques
When a spam lter has more than one ltering tehniques, whih is generally
the ase, then additional onsiderations must be taken.
All the ltering tehniques are assumed to be in sequene. In addition to
this, the inherent harateristis of eah ltering tehnique are statistially
independent of eah other. If the ltering tehniques are not statistially
independent then the sequential set of lters is assumed to onsist of just one
ltering tehnique, and this lter would be relatively less eetive. A ltering
tehnique at one point in the hain will hange the base rate probabilities
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for the next ltering tehnique in the hain. If the base rate probabilities
are hanged by the stimulus emanating from the 1st ltering tehnique, it
should result in atual LR equal to that of Eq.(4.3). This new value will be
denoted as LR1.
LR1 =
P (S ′1|S)
P (S ′1|H)
(4.11)
Therefore Eq.4.6 would look like:
P (S ′1|S)
P (S ′1|H)
=
P (H)
P (S)
· (UH′|H + US′|H)
(US′|S + UH′|S)
(4.12)
The base rate probability and the atual LR hanges every time an e-mail
passes through the new ltering tehnique. LR1 indiates the atual LR after
the 1st ltering tehnique.
If the lter inorporates n ltering tehniques then the internal struture of
the spam lter would more look like as one shown in the Fig.4.2. In addition
to this, with 'n' ltering tehniques the Eq.4.12 would hange to:
i=n∏
i=1
P (S ′
i
|S)
P (S ′i|H)
=
P (H)
P (S)
· (UH′|H + US′|H)
(US′|S + UH′|S)
(4.13)
where P (S ′
i
|S) and P (S ′
i
|H) represent the TP and the FP rates for the ith
ltering tehnique.
Figure 4.2: Sequential use of spam lters
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4.2 Method of Analysis
This setion desribes about the method used to ollet the data for analysis.
The main objetive is to analyze the dierent spam lters on realisti e-mails.
These e-mails should reet the fat that dierent types users have dierent
priorities of reeiving an e-mail.
To ollet the data a survey was onduted by sending an email, shown below,
to 224 people whih inluded students and students who are also employees.
Hi,
This is a short survey about how many spam emails you reeive.I
do this as part of my Masters researh projet at UNIK / Unive-
-rsity of Oslo under the supervision of Prof. Audun Josangs. By
partiipating you'll support researh and thereby help fighting
the problem of spam. It won't take more than a minute or two to
fill in the survey.The information you provide does not have to
be totally exat. Simply answer the questions as preisely as
you an. The survey is anonymous.
The information you provide must relate to one speifi e-mail
servie, suh as Gmail, Hotmail,Yahoomail and Mirosoft Outlook
(Exhange Server). In ase you use multiple e-mail servies you
an fill in a survey for eah one of them separately.
Please follow this link:
https://www.surveymonkey.om/s.aspx?sm=BEyJ8UZq51XyIqJntF2dmQ_3
d_3d
Your ontribution really matters.
Any feedbak on the survey design is also welome.
Thank You.
To reate a survey the servie of surveymonkey.om were used. A snapshot
of the survey, just the Gmail page, has been shown in the Fig.(4.3)
The e-mail was sent to 224 people in order to get the real values for Gmail, Ya-
hoo Mail, Hotmail and MS Outlook (Exhange Server) spam lters. Fig.4.4
shows the lassiation of the people who replied to respetive e-mail ser-
vies. Eah person was asked 6 questions related to spam messages as shown
in the Fig.(4.3). Tables 7.1 and 7.2 in Appendix show the same questions
with the respetive options given to the surveyees.
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Figure 4.3: A snapshot of the survey (Gmail page)
Sine Gmail, Yahoo Mail, Hotmail and MS Outlook (Exhange Server) are
privately owned so, it was diult to know if the spam lters used by these
e-mail servie providers are omposed of single or multiple tehniques. There-
fore, initially I assumed them to be a single tehnique spam lters but later
on onlusion has been made about the number of ltering tehniques eah
of the analyzed lter may be omposed of.
Sine it was diult to give the exat number as an option in the question-
naire so, a probable range was given for all the options. Therefore, for best
results alulation has been done after averaging the respetive data.
Aording to the latest data in [1℄ we have assumed the base rate probability
of spam to be 97%.
In addition to this, the ost of a FP is assumed to be equal to the benet of
a TN and the ost of a FN is assumed to be equal to the benet of a TP.
Though these four values an also be dierent.
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Figure 4.4: Shows numbers of people who replied to the survey
Table 4.1: Shows survey statistis obtained for Gmail. Statistis orrespond
to the total number of e-mails altogether reeived by 104 people in inboxes
and spam folders in 1 day and money they are ready to pay for avoiding a
ham ending up in the spam folder and a spam ending up in the inbox.
Number of mails reeived in your Inbox daily (HAM
"good mail/non-spam/soliited mail" + SPAM).
1211
Number of SPAM reeived in your SPAM folder daily. 1017
Number of SPAM reeived in your Inbox daily. 238
Do you reeive any HAM in your SPAM folder? 23
How muh would you be willing to pay for avoiding that
SPAM ever ends up in your Inbox ?
221 $ ents
How muh would you be willing to pay for avoiding that
HAM ever ends up in your SPAM folder ?
228 $ ents
4.2.1 Analysis of Gmail Filter
This setion will rst investigate the Gmail spam lter based on statistis
obtained from the survey.
Out of 224 people 104 were Gmail users. Table4.1 shows the average number
of mails olletively reeived in inboxes and spam folders by 104 people in
1 day and the amount of money they are ready to pay for avoiding a ham
ending up in the spam folder and a spam ending up in the inbox.
As shown in the Table4.1:
TP = 1017 and FN = 238
FP = 23 and TN = 1211− 238 = 973
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In order to nd out whether the spam lter is perfetly tuned aording to the
needs of the users we need atual LR (LRGmail) and optimal LR' (LR
′
Gmail
).
Therefore:
LRGmail =
TP_rate
FP_rate
=
TP
TP+F N
F P
F P+TN
=
1017
1017+238
23
23+973
= 0.8103
0.0230
(4.14)
And the Optimal LR is alulated aording to the Eq.4.4 (we have assume
that BH′|H = CS′|H and (BS′|S = CH′|S):
LR′
Gmail
= P (H)
P (S)
· (UH′|H+US′H)
(U
S′|S+UH′|S)
= 0.00684
0.21437
(4.15)
Both LRGmail and LR
′
Gmail
an be represented on the ROC urve as points
(0.0230, 0.8103) and (0.21437, 0.00684) respetively. Distane between the
two points will show the tuning of the spam lter. Therefore:
σ =
√
(0.8103−0.00684)2+(0.0230−0.21437)2√
2
= 0.584
(4.16)
σ 6= 0, whih implies that the Gmail spam lter is not tuned aording to
the needs of this group of 104 students.
Utility provided by the Gmail spam lter is shown in the following alula-
tion:
U = 97 · [0.8103 · 221 + 0.1896 · (−221)] + 3 · [0.9769 · 228 + 0.023 · (−228)]
= 13958.4135
(4.17)
Value of U=13958.4135 shows that the utility provided by the Gmail spam
lter to the given users is positive and very high. Therefore this lter is good
for the given users who are students in this ase.
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Gmail-ROC urve:
Figure 4.5: ROC urve for Gmail spam lter
Intersetion of two line on the urve (Fig.4.5) shows the point LRGmail for the
spei deision riterion suh that TP and FP rates are 0.8103 and 0.0230
respetively.
4.2.2 Analysis of HotMail Filter
Similar to subsetion (4.2.1) this setion will also, with all the same assump-
tions, investigate the Hotmail spam lter based on statistis from the survey.
Out of 224 people 31 were Hotmail users. Table4.2 shows the average number
of mails olletively reeived in inboxes and spam folders by 31 people in 1
day and the amount of money they are ready to pay for avoiding a ham
ending up in the spam folder and a spam ending up in the inbox.
As shown in the Table4.2:
TP = 250 and FN = 155
FP = 9 and TN = 600− 155 = 445
In order to analyze the spam lter we need LRhotmail and LR
′
hotmail:
LRhotmail =
TP_rate
FP_rate
= 0.6172
0.0198
(4.18)
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Table 4.2: Shows survey statistis obtained from people using Hotmail.
Statistis orrespond to the total number of e-mails altogether reeived by
31 people in inboxes and spam folders in 1 day and money they are ready to
pay in 1 day for avoiding a ham ending up in the spam folder and a spam
ending up in the inbox.
Number of mails reeived in your Inbox daily (HAM
"good mail/non-spam/soliited mail" + SPAM).
600
Number of SPAM reeived in your SPAM folder daily. 250
Number of SPAM reeived in your Inbox daily. 155
Do you reeive any HAM in your SPAM folder? 9
How muh would you be willing to pay for avoiding that
SPAM ever ends up in your Inbox ?
78 $ ents
How muh would you be willing to pay for avoiding that
HAM ever ends up in your SPAM folder ?
318 $ ents
And the Optimal LR is alulated aording to the Eq.4.4:
LR′hotmail =
0.0954
0.7566
(4.19)
Both LRhotmail and LR
′
hotmail
an be represented on the ROC urve as points
(0.0198, 0.6172) and (0.7566, 0.0954) respetively. Distane between the two
points will show the tuning of the spam lter. Therefore:
σ =
√
(0.0198−0.7566)2+(0.6172−0.0954)2√
2
= 0.6384
(4.20)
σ 6= 0, whih implies that the Hotmail spam lter is not tuned aording to
the needs of this group of 31 students.
Utility provided by the Hotmail spam lter is shown in the following alu-
lation:
U = 97 · [0.6172 · 78 + 0.3828 · (−78)] + 3 · [0.9802 · 318 + 0.0198 · (−318)]
= 2395.632
(4.21)
Value of U=2395.632 shows that the utility provided by the Hotmail spam
lter to the given users is positive and high.
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Hotmail-ROC urve:
Figure 4.6: ROC urve for Hotmail spam lter
Intersetion of two line on the urve (Fig.4.6) shows the point LRhotmail for
the spei deision riterion suh that TP and FP rates are 0.6172 and
0.0198 respetively.
4.2.3 Analysis of Yahoo Mail Filter
Similar to subsetion (4.2.1) this setion will also, with all the same assump-
tions, investigate the Yahoo Mail spam lter based on statistis from the
survey.
Out of 224 people 49 were Yahoo Mail users. Table4.3 shows the average
number of mails olletively reeived in inboxes and spam folders by 49 people
in 1 day and the amount of money they are ready to pay for avoiding a ham
ending up in the spam folder and a spam ending up in the inbox.
As shown in the Table4.3:
TP = 285 and FN = 106
FP = 17 and TN = 219− 106 = 113
In order to analyze the spam lter we need LRY Mail and LR
′
Y Mail':
LRY Mail =
TP_rate
FP_rate
= 0.7289
0.1307
(4.22)
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Table 4.3: Shows survey statistis obtained from people using Yahoo Mail.
Statistis orrespond to the total number of e-mails altogether reeived by
49 people in inboxes and spam folders in 1 day and money they are ready to
pay for avoiding a ham ending up in the spam folder and a spam ending up
in the inbox.
Number of mails reeived in your Inbox daily (HAM
"good mail/non-spam/soliited mail" + SPAM).
219
Number of SPAM reeived in your SPAM folder daily. 285
Number of SPAM reeived in your Inbox daily. 106
Do you reeive any HAM in your SPAM folder? 17
How muh would you be willing to pay for avoiding that
SPAM ever ends up in your Inbox ?
153 $ ents
How muh would you be willing to pay for avoiding that
HAM ever ends up in your SPAM folder ?
14 $ ents
And the Optimal LR is alulated aording to the Eq.4.4:
LR′
Y Mail
=
0.00042
0.14841
(4.23)
Both LRY Mail and LR
′
Y Mail
an be represented on the ROC urve as points
(0.1307, 0.7289) and (0.14841, 0.00042) respetively. Distane between the
two points will show the tuning of the spam lter. Therefore:
σ =
√
(0.1307−0.14841)2+(0.7289−0.00042)2√
2
= 0.5153
(4.24)
σ 6= 0, whih implies that the Yahoomail spam lter is not tuned aording
to the needs of this group of 49 students.
Utility provided by the Yahoomail spam lter is shown in the following al-
ulation:
U = 97 · [0.7289 · 153 + 0.2711 · (−153)] + 3 · [0.8693 · 14 + 0.1307 · (−14)]
= 6825.231
(4.25)
Value of U=6825.231 shows that the utility provided by the Yahoomail spam
lter to the given users is positive and high.
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Yahoomail-ROC urve:
Figure 4.7: ROC urve for Yahoomail spam lter
Intersetion of two line on the urve (Fig.4.7) shows the point LRY Mail for
the speis deision riterion suh that TP and FP rates are 0.7289 and
0.1307 respetively
4.2.4 Analysis of MS Outlook (Exhange Server) Filter
Similar to subsetion (4.2.1) this setion will also, with all the same assump-
tions, investigate the MS Outlook (Exhange Server) spam lter based on
statistis from the survey.
Out of 224 people 40 were MS Outlook (Exhange Server) users. Table4.4
shows the average number of mails olletively reeived in inboxes and spam
folders by 40 people in 1 day and the amount of money they are ready to
pay for avoiding a ham ending up in the spam folder and a spam ending up
in the inbox.
As shown in the Table4.4:
TP = 281 and FN = 201
FP = 13 and TN = 640− 201 = 439
LRMS_exch_server and LR
′
MS_exch_server are as follows:
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Table 4.4: Shows survey statistis obtained from people using MS Outlook
(Exhange Server). Statistis orrespond to the total number of e-mails alto-
gether reeived by 40 people in inboxes and spam folders in 1 day and money
they are ready to pay for avoiding a ham ending up in the spam folder and
a spam ending up in the inbox.
Number of mails reeived in your Inbox daily (HAM
"good mail/non-spam/soliited mail" + SPAM).
640
Number of SPAM reeived in your SPAM folder daily. 281
Number of SPAM reeived in your Inbox daily. 201
Do you reeive any HAM in your SPAM folder? 13
How muh would you be willing to pay for avoiding that
SPAM ever ends up in your Inbox ?
69 $ ents
How muh would you be willing to pay for avoiding that
HAM ever ends up in your SPAM folder ?
27900 $ ents
LRMS_exch_server =
TP_rate
FP_rate
= 0.5829
0.0287
(4.26)
LR′MS_exch_server =
0.8370
0.0669
(4.27)
Both LRMS_exch_server and LR
′
MS_exch_server
an be represented on the
ROC urve as points (0.0287, 0.5829) and (0.0669, 0.8370) respetively. Dis-
tane between the two points will show the tuning of the spam lter. There-
fore:
σ =
√
(0.0287−0.0669)2+(0.5829−0.8370)2√
2
= 0.1817
(4.28)
σ 6= 0, whih implies that the Yahoomail spam lter is not tuned aording
to the needs of this group of 40 students.
Utility provided by the Yahoomail spam lter is shown in the following al-
ulation:
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U = 97 · [0.5829 · 69 + 0.4171 · (−69)] + 3 · [0.9713 · 27900 + 0.0287 · (−27900)]
= 80005.3144
(4.29)
Value of U=80005.3144 shows that the utility provided by the Yahoomail
spam lter to the given users is positive and very high.
MS exhange server spam lter-ROC urve:
Figure 4.8: ROC urve for MS exhange server spam lter
Intersetion of two line on the urve (Fig.4.8) shows the point LRMS_exch_server
for the partiular deision riterion suh that TP and FP rates are 0.5829
and 0.0287 respetively
Chapter 5
Spam Filter Comparison and
Disussion
Generally the omparison of spam lters are done on the basis of the TP,
FN, FP and TN rates. The less the FP rate or the more the TP rate is the
better the spam lter. This is the onventional rule to evaluate any lter by
now.
Very often the main onern is on FPs beause generally a FP arries more
weight than other alternatives beause in ase of e-mails one would normally
prefer reeiving a spam message over losing a ham message but it may also
depend on the user priorities.
Unlike said above, here we are not going to ompare the spam lters on the
basis of any rates but on the basis of the needs of the users and on the basis
of the utility provided to them by the spam lters. We will ompare on the
basis of STI (σ) and utility (U), dened in the setion (4.1). The less the
value of σ the more the spam lter works aording to user needs and the
more the value of U the better is the lter for the user.
The survey was onduted among students. At rst the omparison is made
by analyzing the tuning of the spam lter for students (Table 5.1) and later
Table (5.2) shows the omparison of the spam lters on the basis of the utility
provided by spam lters to the students.
Though not the same students are surveyed for eah spam lter but sine
just the students are surveyed for all 4 spam lters so we an assume that the
students have same kind of priorities when it omes to loosing or aepting
e-mails.
Therefore from the Table (5.1) we an say that MS Outlook Exhange Server
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Table 5.1: Comparison of spam lters on the basis of Subjetive Tuning Index
(σ)
σ
(1) MS Outlook Exhange Server
Spam Filter
0.1817
(2) Yahoo Mail Spam Filter 0.5153
(3) Gmail Spam Filter 0.584
(4) Hotmail Spam Filter 0.6384
Table 5.2: Comparison of spam lters on the basis of Utility (U)
U
(1) MS Outlook Exhange Server
Spam Filter
0.80005.134
(2) Yahoo Mail Spam Filter 0.5153
(3) Gmail Spam Filter 0.584
(4) Hotmail Spam Filter 0.6384
Spam Filter is quite lose in working aording to the needs of the users as
it has the minimum value of σ and Hotmail Spam Filter needs to be tuned
quite a lot to work aording to the users need beause it has the maximum
value of σ but both of them are not tuned aording the needs of the users.
They are not optimal.
Sine MS Outlook Exhange Server Spam Filter provides more utility to
the users than other spam lters in question. Results obtained from the
alulations of the utility of the respetive spam lters in setion (4.2) whih
are also shown in Table (5.2) below shows that MS Outlook Exhange Server
Spam Filter provides the maximum utility and Hotmail spam lter provides
the minimum utility to the intended users. Therefore it an be onluded
that MS Outlook Exhange Server Spam Filter is good, than other lters in
experiment, for students
With the use of Signal Detetion Theory for analyzing spam lters we an
easily get to know if the spam lter whih the user is using is tuned aording
to his needs or not. In addition to this we ould also know the utility provided
to the user by the spam lter.
Using this method it an be easily found out whih lter is suitable for whih
user/group/oraganization or how muh a lter needs tuning to satisfy the
needs of the user.
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Interesting results an be onluded from the Eq.(4.12). We an see that
ost of FP is inversely proportional to the FP rate i.e. as the ost of the FP
will inrease the FP rate will derease. It is important to talk about the FP
beause generally the ost of FP is higher than the other osts.
Talking about the deision riterion, while tuning the spam lter it should
be noted that one an not simultaneously derease the FP rate and inrease
the TP rate. One of them inreases as the other dereases, therefore, it is
very important to set the optimal deision riterion in general but for spei
user(s) it an be set aording to their needs.
Chapter 6
Conlusion and Future work
This thesis desribes the analysis of spam lters within the framework of
signal detetion theory.
The riterion value plays an important part in deision making. It represents
the environment in whih the spam lter operates with the user's subjetive
view of the ost and benets of false and orret ltering.
This thesis talks about the optimality of the spam lters. It sheds light on
how to know whether the spam lter is tuned aording to the needs of the
partiular user or not and what utility (positive or negative) does it provides
to the user. Thus the user ould easily hoose whih lter to use.
This ould also be useful for the ompanies whih make spam lters as with
the appliation of SDT they an easily know the needs of the users of the
organization and ould build a spam lter whih mathes the needs of the
organization on the whole. Therefore spam lter in future ould be easily
ustomized.
Future work ould be based on analyzing soial aspets of using a spam lter.
It would be really interesting to study how a spam lter ould eet soial
behavior of the user. Studies ould be done on what type of people prefer
whih kind of lter, what hanges are seen on user's soial behavior after
using partiular spam lter whih is tuned to ertain level and how it ould
eet the soial life of the user. Considering the soial aspets, after knowing
whih level of tuning is best for what type of people, the soial satisfation
level of the of the users would inrease.
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Table 7.1: Questionnaire for Spam Survey for Gmail & Yahoo Mail Users
Gmail Yahoo Mail
Where do you live? Country 11C
Number of mails reeived in your Inbox daily
(HAM "good mail/non-spam/soliited mail"
+ SPAM)
(1) less than 5, (2) between 6-10,
(3) between11-15, (4) between 16-
20, (5) more than 20, (6) 0
(1) less than 5, (2) between 6-10,
(3) between11-15, (4) between 16-
20, (5) more than 20, (6) 0
Number of SPAM reeived in your SPAM
folder daily
(1) less than 5 (2) between 6-10,
(3) between11-15, (4) between 16-
20, (5) more than 20, (6) 0
(1) less than 5, (2) between 6-10,
(3) between11-15, (4) between 16-
20, (5) more than 20, (6) 0
Number of SPAM reeived in your Inbox
daily
(1) less than 5, (2) between 6-10,
(3) between11-15, (4) between 16-
20, (5) more than 20, (6) 0
(1) less than 5, (2) between 6-10,
(3) between11-15, (4) between 16-
20, (5) more than 20, (6) 0
Do you reeive any HAM in your SPAM
folder
(1) No, I don't reeive any, (2) Yes
1 daily, (3) Yes 2 daily, (4) Yes
3 or more daily, (5) Yes 1 in a
month, (6) Yes 2 in a month, (7)
Yes 3 or more in a month, (8) Yes
1 in a year, (9) Yes 2 in a year,
(10) Yes 3 or more in a year,
(1) No, I don't reeive any, (2) Yes
1 daily, (3) Yes 2 daily, (4) Yes
3 or more daily, (5) Yes 1 in a
month, (6) Yes 2 in a month, (7)
Yes 3 or more in a month, (8) Yes
1 in a year, (9) Yes 2 in a year,
(10) Yes 3 or more in a year,
How muh would you be willing to pay for
avoiding that SPAM ever ends up in your
Inbox ?
(1) Nothing, I'm OK with spams,
(2)1ent of $ daily, (3)2ent of
$ daily, (4)5ent of $ daily,
(5)10ent of $ daily, (6)25ent
of $ daily, (7)50ent of $ daily,
(8)1$ daily, (9)2$ daily, (10)5$
daily, (11)10$ daily, (12)25$ daily,
(13)50$ daily, (14)100$ daily, (15)
more than 100$ daily
(1) Nothing, I'm OK with spams,
(2)1ent of $ daily, (3)2ent of
$ daily, (4)5ent of $ daily,
(5)10ent of $ daily, (6)25ent
of $ daily, (7)50ent of $ daily,
(8)1$ daily, (9)2$ daily, (10)5$
daily, (11)10$ daily, (12)25$ daily,
(13)50$ daily, (14)100$ daily, (15)
more than 100$ daily
How muh would you be willing to pay for
avoiding that HAM ever ends up in your
SPAM folder ?
(1) Nothing, I'm OK with ham
in spam folder, (2)1ent of $
daily, (3)2ent of $ daily, (4)5ent
of $ daily, (5)10ent of $ daily,
(6)25ent of $ daily, (7)50ent
of $ daily, (8)1$ daily, (9)2$
daily, (10)5$ daily, (11)10$ daily,
(12)25$ daily, (13)50$ daily,
(14)100$ daily, (15) more than
100$ daily
(1) Nothing, I'm OK with ham
in spam folder, (2)1ent of $
daily, (3)2ent of $ daily, (4)5ent
of $ daily, (5)10ent of $ daily,
(6)25ent of $ daily, (7)50ent
of $ daily, (8)1$ daily, (9)2$
daily, (10)5$ daily, (11)10$ daily,
(12)25$ daily, (13)50$ daily,
(14)100$ daily, (15) more than
100$ daily
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Table 7.2: Questionnaire for Spam Survey for Hotmail & MS Outlook (Exhange Server) Users
Hotmail MS Outlook (Exhange Server)
Where do you live? Country 11C
Number of mails reeived in your Inbox daily
(HAM "good mail/non-spam/soliited mail"
+ SPAM)
(1) less than 5, (2) between 6-10,
(3) between11-15, (4) between 16-
20, (5) more than 20, (6) 0
(1) less than 5, (2) between 6-10,
(3) between11-15, (4) between 16-
20, (5) more than 20, (6) 0
Number of SPAM reeived in your SPAM
folder daily
(1) less than 5 (2) between 6-10,
(3) between11-15, (4) between 16-
20, (5) more than 20, (6) 0
(1) less than 5, (2) between 6-10,
(3) between11-15, (4) between 16-
20, (5) more than 20, (6) 0
Number of SPAM reeived in your Inbox
daily
(1) less than 5, (2) between 6-10,
(3) between11-15, (4) between 16-
20, (5) more than 20, (6) 0
(1) less than 5, (2) between 6-10,
(3) between11-15, (4) between 16-
20, (5) more than 20, (6) 0
Do you reeive any HAM in your SPAM
folder
(1) No, I don't reeive any, (2) Yes
1 daily, (3) Yes 2 daily, (4) Yes
3 or more daily, (5) Yes 1 in a
month, (6) Yes 2 in a month, (7)
Yes 3 or more in a month, (8) Yes
1 in a year, (9) Yes 2 in a year,
(10) Yes 3 or more in a year,
(1) No, I don't reeive any, (2) Yes
1 daily, (3) Yes 2 daily, (4) Yes
3 or more daily, (5) Yes 1 in a
month, (6) Yes 2 in a month, (7)
Yes 3 or more in a month, (8) Yes
1 in a year, (9) Yes 2 in a year,
(10) Yes 3 or more in a year,
How muh would you be willing to pay for
avoiding that SPAM ever ends up in your
Inbox ?
(1) Nothing, I'm OK with spams,
(2)1ent of $ daily, (3)2ent of
$ daily, (4)5ent of $ daily,
(5)10ent of $ daily, (6)25ent
of $ daily, (7)50ent of $ daily,
(8)1$ daily, (9)2$ daily, (10)5$
daily, (11)10$ daily, (12)25$ daily,
(13)50$ daily, (14)100$ daily, (15)
more than 100$ daily
(1) Nothing, I'm OK with spams,
(2)1ent of $ daily, (3)2ent of
$ daily, (4)5ent of $ daily,
(5)10ent of $ daily, (6)25ent
of $ daily, (7)50ent of $ daily,
(8)1$ daily, (9)2$ daily, (10)5$
daily, (11)10$ daily, (12)25$ daily,
(13)50$ daily, (14)100$ daily, (15)
more than 100$ daily
How muh would you be willing to pay for
avoiding that HAM ever ends up in your
SPAM folder ?
(1) Nothing, I'm OK with ham
in spam folder, (2)1ent of $
daily, (3)2ent of $ daily, (4)5ent
of $ daily, (5)10ent of $ daily,
(6)25ent of $ daily, (7)50ent
of $ daily, (8)1$ daily, (9)2$
daily, (10)5$ daily, (11)10$ daily,
(12)25$ daily, (13)50$ daily,
(14)100$ daily, (15) more than
100$ daily
(1) Nothing, I'm OK with ham
in spam folder, (2)1ent of $
daily, (3)2ent of $ daily, (4)5ent
of $ daily, (5)10ent of $ daily,
(6)25ent of $ daily, (7)50ent
of $ daily, (8)1$ daily, (9)2$
daily, (10)5$ daily, (11)10$ daily,
(12)25$ daily, (13)50$ daily,
(14)100$ daily, (15) more than
100$ daily
